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Abstract 
The operability of society’s critical infrastructures depends on the availability of electric power. Adverse events (natural 
disasters, intelligent adversary, etc.) occur rarely, but power system failure under such conditions has typically devastating effects 
on the economy and lives. A key factor in the system’s ability to withstand massive sudden damage caused by adverse events is 
its topology: the number of system elements that generate and demand power and the connections between them. The topology 
factor can be quantified by analyzing the impact of all possible combinations of unrecoverable faults (fault scenarios) on the 
availability and connectivity of system elements. As the number of possible fault scenarios grows as 2M with increasing number 
M of system elements, such an analysis becomes a computational challenge for large-scale systems. The paper discusses 
possibilities of reducing the computational complexity of the problem.        
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1. Introduction 
The US President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection [1] identified electric power systems as one 
of the Nation’s eight critical infrastructures (CIs). With the operability of the other seven CIs – telecommunications, 
natural gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, government services, and emergency 
services – depending on the availability of electric power, the resilience and reliability of power systems is of crucial 
importance. Yet, multiple studies (see, e.g., [2-4]) indicate that the modern electric power infrastructure is not 
prepared to withstand many forms of large-scale damage caused by natural (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, wild 
fires) and man-made malicious (physical destructions or electronic intrusions) physical events. Such events occur 
rarely, but their impact on the economy and lives is typically devastating.  
Faults caused by adverse events are not random and cannot be predicted. The damage they cause is typically 
several orders of magnitude bigger in scale than damage due to operational faults (manufacturing faults, fatigue 
cracking, and maloperation) [8] and with limited possibility for repair in a short term. Traditional 
reliability/availability analysis [5-7] is concerned with the system performance in the presence of operational faults 
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that are random, expected to occur within a predicted time interval, and can be repaired within an estimated time. 
Therefore, approaches different from traditional methods are required to analyze the ability of power systems to 
withstand massive sudden damage caused by adverse events (hereafter referred to as survivability).  
In power systems, survivability is associated with the continuation of the generation and distribution of power 
from generators to loads. The analysis of the propagation of faults initiated by an adverse event within a system 
brings a useful insight into the system vulnerability [9], but the ultimate question of survivability analysis is whether 
a system can survive an event. In this regard, the main focus of survivability analysis in application to power 
systems is the final steady state of a system after all faults (including cascading and secondary) have occurred and 
before any repair has been accomplished. This state can be evaluated based on i) how much power is available in the 
system after damage occurred and ii) whether this amount is sufficient to satisfy the existing power demand. Notice 
that eventually, expected faults under normal operational conditions may result in an unexpected large-scale power 
system failure such as a blackout. Outcomes (not evolution of damage) of such events are also a subject of 
survivability analysis.  
As many factors [10] influence the system survivability, our analysis has been centered on quantifying the 
capacity inherent in a system topology to maintain operations after damage occurred (hereafter referred to as 
topological survivability). Indeed, the topology of a power system – the number of loads and power sources 
(hereafter, generators) included in the system and how they are connected with one another – determines whether 
power will be available to the loads after damage occurred and, therefore, is a key factor to consider. 
Previously, we developed a basic mathematical framework [11] and computational algorithms [12,13] for 
assessing the topological survivability of a power system with multiple distributed generators and a single load. This 
approach is applicable when the load represents either an isolated industrial load, or multiple commercial and 
residential loads interconnected into a single distribution system, or a lower voltage level network.  The current 
paper discusses how survivability analysis can be applied to a power system with a few voltage levels and multiple 
distributed loads. An issue with the computational analysis of large-scale systems will also be addressed. 
2. Mathematical framework 
To evaluate the topological survivability of a power system, one needs to determine availability and connectivity 
of the system elements after a given number of faults occurred in the system and to calculate the power flow 
available to the loads. As the analysis of topological survivability focuses on the outcome of damage, faults of 
principal concern are failures of system elements that cannot be recovered in the short term. Therefore, multiple 
faults are viewed as simultaneous events; only one fault can occur in a given element. Faults in interconnections are 
not considered as any such faults are equivalent to faults in adjacent elements. Since, one cannot predict what 
elements and how many of them will be damaged under adverse conditions, the outcome of all possible 
combinations of faults should be analyzed. A combination of faults is called a fault scenario. The total number of 
fault scenarios N is independent of the system topology and can be easily computed: ( ) 2M
m
N N m  ¦ , where m is 
the number of faults and ( ) ! !( )!N m M m M m   is the number of fault scenarios at a given m.  
Each fault scenario results in one of three types of responses from the system depending on the amount of power 
available to loads after damage: “no response”, reconfiguration or load-shedding, and complete failure. In “no 
response” scenarios, power flow to loads is preserved.  Scenarios, in which power is supplied to loads in reduced 
amount, are reconfiguration scenarios. If faults completely isolate loads from power sources, the scenario is that of 
complete failure. The numbers of fault scenarios leading to each response are S, R, and F, respectively.  
The total number of fault scenarios leading to each of the three responses can be used to determine the response 
probability P at a given m: ( ) /P S S N  (probability of “no response” scenarios), ( ) /P R R N  (probability of 
reconfiguration scenarios), and ( ) /P F F N  (probability of complete failure). The probabilities of the three 
responses sum to unity at a given m.  
In [11] we demonstrated step by step how one can analytically calculate the numbers of fault scenarios S, R, and 
F and the response probabilities for small topologies containing two and three generators and a single load. As a 
number of system elements and complexity of the system topology increase, computational analysis becomes the 
only choice to generate fault scenarios and analyze their impact on system survivability. For real-size systems, even 
computations may become unfeasible. The computational burden can, to some degree, be overcome by utilizing 
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advanced algorithms and computational techniques [13]. If one can find a way to reduce the number of system 
elements and disintegrate the system topology into smaller and simpler sub-topologies without losing information on 
the availability and connectivity of system elements, computational expenses can be reduced even more 
significantly.   
3. Power system representation for survivability analysis 
In modern power systems, power is transmitted from the bulk power sources to loads over transmission, 
subtransmission, and distribution networks [14,15]. Step-up and step-down transformers transfer power from one 
level of voltage to another. Power may undergo four or five transformations between generator and ultimate user 
[15]. High-voltage transmission lines can operate at up to 765 kV AC and ~1,000 kV DC [16]. Very large industrial 
customers may be directly served from the transmission line. The portion of the transmission system that connects 
the high-voltage substations through step-down transformers to the distribution substations is called the 
subtransmission network. The subtransmission systems typically range from 69 to 138 kV. Some large industrial 
loads may be served from the subtransmission line. The distribution system operates at lower voltage levels and is 
also subdivided into primary and secondary networks depending on voltage level [15]. Some small industrial loads 
are served directly by the primary feeders. The secondary distribution network reduces the voltage for utilization by 
commercial and residential loads down to 240/120 V.  
As a conequence, even though the geographical layout of electric power systems is two-dimensional, the system 
topology is three-dimensional, with the additional dimension being the voltage level. The system layers 
corresponding to different voltage levels consist of two-dimensional individual networks that may or may not be 
interconnected. Individual networks typically have different topologies and different network characteristics. Power 
can be supplied to any level directly from power plants and/or from the higher-voltage level network. In a case of 
distribution networks, power can or will (in next-generation systems) also be supplied from distributed energy 
resources and storage devices. Each individual network has connections to loads that are individual consumers, 
distribution networks, and/or connections to the lower voltage level networks. An abstract representation of an 
electric power system is shown in Fig. 1. Topologies of individual networks (Transmission 1, Transmission 2, 
Subtransmission 1, …) are not shown. Arrow-headed links show the direction of power flow. Generators (power 
plants, renewable energy sources, storage, and/or higher-voltage level networks) are shown as circles marked by 
“~”. Loads are shown as circles marked by “-”. Dots at the beginning of a link indicate that multiple layers can exist 
between the layers shown in the figure. Not shown are multiple networks at the same voltage level that are supplied 
power from the same higher-voltage level network, but not connected with one another.  
Figure 1 illustrates the idea that topological survivability of the whole system is determined by topological 
survivability of individual networks at different voltage levels and by connections existing between these networks. 
Indeed, removing any layer or connections between any two layers would interrupt bulk power flow to distribution 
networks. On the other hand, individual networks may survive even if higher- and lower-voltage level networks 
become unavailable.  Thus, a problem of the analysis of topological survivability of a power system can be re-
formulated as the analysis of topological survivability of 
individual networks that constitute the power system. Based on 
survivability assessment of individual networks, one can 
compare topological survivability of networks at different 
voltage levels, identify “weak links” in the whole 
infrastructure, and suggest design strategies to enhance the 
system survivability. As the scale of an individual network is 
smaller than the scale of the whole infrastructure, such an 
approach is the first step to reduce the complexity of the 
computational analysis.   
4. Individual network representation 
Standard diagrams of power systems contain redundant 
information that is not necessary for the analysis of the 
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Fig. 1 Power system structure 
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topological survivability. What is of importance for survivability analysis is the number of generators and loads, 
their locations within the network, their connections with one another, and the amount of power they supply 
to/demand from the network. Therefore, the next step in reducing the computational complexity of the analysis is to 
reduce the number of system elements by representing all elements that are connected in series as a single element 
(hereafter, link). Indeed, a fault in any of the elements connected in series results in interruption of power flow 
through all of them. Let us consider as an example a possible general configuration of a FREEDM distribution 
primary system [17]. The main grid (higher-voltage level network) and two distributed energy resources supply 
power to eight loads connected in a loop (Fig. 2a). In the figure, SST and FID stand for “solid state transformer” and 
“fault isolation device”, respectively. Figure 2b shows the result of transforming Fig. 2a into a diagram in which 
system elements connected in series are represented by a single link. Links that include generators (hereafter, 
vertical VT links) and links that include loads (hereafter, vertical VB links) are shown by arrow-headed links. The 
direction of arrows shows the direction of power flow. Links that simply transfer power from one point to another 
are called horizontal links and are labeled by “H” in Fig. 2b. The total number of elements in this topology is M = 
22, that is, there are 222 scenarios to analyze. 
After the initial number of system elements is reduced, the system topology with multiple generators and 
distributed loads can be disintegrated into sub-topologies with multiple generators and a single load. Indeed, faults 
in vertical links connecting other loads to the generator bus cannot interrupt power flow to the load under 
consideration. Therefore, only those fault scenarios that directly affect power flow to a given load have to be 
analyzed. Faults that isolate other loads from the system may increase the amount of power available to the load 
under consideration and thus, increase its chances to survive. This factor can be taken into account by analyzing all 
loads simultaneously.  
As there are eight loads in Fig. 2b, there are eight sub-topologies to consider. However, one can utilize the fact 
that some loads “see” the system in a similar way. In the topology in Fig. 2b, all eight loads “see” the system as 
shown in Fig. 2c, where the correspondence of links A1-A3 to links VT1-VT3 in Fig. 2b depends on the load under 
consideration. The load (any of VB-links in Fig. 2b) is shown by link A4 in Fig. 2c. Links A5-A8 correspond to 
horizontal links H1-H11 in Fig. 2b.  Here again, links connected in series are represented by a single link. Table 1 
shows the correspondence between links in the topologies shown in Figs. 2b,c for all loads.   
Thus, the analysis of the initial topology shown in Fig. 2a is reduced to the analysis of the topology shown in Fig. 
2c that has only 8 elements and 256 fault scenarios to consider. The complexity of the problem is reduced 
drastically. The computational algorithm described in [13] can be used as a core of a computational procedure. A 
more complex topology with loads connected to the system by multiple links is discussed in [18]. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, a new approach to reducing the computational complexity of the analysis of topological 
survivability of large-scale multilayered power systems with multiple generators and distributed loads is discussed. 
In particular, it is shown that the problem can be reduced to the analysis of individual networks corresponding to a 
given voltage level. A complex topology of an individual network with multiple generators and multiple loads can 
be disintegrated into simple topologies with multiple generators and a single load connected to the system by a 
 
                
                                                        a)                                                                            b)                                                        c) 
Fig. 2.  A FREEDM distribution primary system (a), its simplified diagram for survivability analysis (b), single-load diagram (c). 
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single link. In such a way, computational expenses can be reduced considerably. The application of the approach is 
demonstrated for a general configuration of a FREEDM distribution primary system [17]. A similar approach can be 
applied to any multilayered system with sources and sinks and for the analysis of network characteristics [19]. 
 
Table 1 
Correspondence of links in Figs. 2b,c for individual loads 
Loads, A4 A1 A2 A3 A5 A6 A7 A8 
VB1 VT1 VT3 VT2 H11 H8-H10 H3-H7 H1,H2 
VB2 VT1 VT3 VT2 H1, H11 H8-H10 H3-H7 H2 
VB3 VT2 VT1 VT3 H3 H1,H2, H11 H8-H10 H4-H7 
VB4 VT2 VT1 VT3 H3,H4 H1,H2, H11 H8-H10 H5-H7 
VB5 VT2 VT1 VT3 H3-H5 H1,H2, H11 H8-H10 H6,H7 
VB6 VT2 VT1 VT3 H3-H6 H1,H2, H11 H8-H10 H7 
VB7 VT3 VT2 VT1 H8 H3-H7 H1,H2, H11 H9,H10 
VB8 VT3 VT2 VT1 H8, H9 H3-H7 H1,H2, H11 H10 
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